Monday, August 30 2010

Tell all the truth slant

At Greenbelt today, and I also penned this piece for the festival magazine:

“Tell all the truth, but tell it slant,” wrote the poet Emily Dickinson: “Success in circuit lies.” The advice is itself a truth, a commendation in the art of looking sideways.

Dickinson lived in an age when it was becoming impossible to find truth straightforwardly, if ever there has been such a time. In her generation, the Victorian crisis about belief in God peaked. Philosophers announced the death of God. Naturalists challenged what had always seemed to be the best evidence for God: nature’s apparent design.

What is striking about Dickinson, though, is that she both experienced the darkness of that doubt, and found a way to transform it into an experience that produced meaning. It’s all about the pursuit of the circuitous.

That her medium was poetry is no mere detail. It is almost the whole story. Poetry not only allows her to express herself – her desire for consolation, her anxiety about what’s disappearing. It is also the form of writing par excellence that can keep an eye open for what is peripheral. It can discern truths that words otherwise struggle to articulate. It glimpses, and hopes.

She was born in 1830, and although her poems are now widely available, most of her work was not published in her own lifetime. That was partly because she lived as a recluse. In the later part of her life, she even refused to leave her room. But she had, no less, many friends and was as prolific a letter-writer as she was a poet.

One of her frequent interlocutors was Thomas Wentworth Higginson, and here’s how Dickinson describes herself to him: ‘small, like the Wren, and my Hair is bold, like the Chestnut Bur, and my eyes, like the Sherry in the Glass, that the Guest leaves.’ That description came in lieu of the photograph Higginson had requested. But isn’t it a case when a few words are worth far more than a picture? Those allusions – wren-like, bold hair, eyes like sherry dregs. They enable us to imagine her person.

She draws on the philosophy that recognises our wisdom derives not so much from what we think we know, as from the acknowledgement of what we don’t know. Understanding that generates wisdom. It reaches back to Socrates, who went around ancient Athens telling folk that there was one thing he knew for sure: he was ignorant. He also demonstrated to others that they couldn’t be so sure about what they thought they knew too. With his famous questioning, he led them to an existential precipice: to know Socrates was to know someone who sought all the truth, and in so doing, realised it mostly lies out of sight. He was profoundly disliked as a result, his bursting ego-filled bubbles arguably leading to his condemnation and death.

The same perception is written into the Hebrew tradition, not least in the story of Moses. When he ascends Mount Sinai, he enters a dark cloud. Moses asks to see Yahweh’s glory, and Yahweh concurs, only he will cover Moses with his hand as he passes by, ‘for man shall not see me and live.’ Moses too does not see anything directly. He apparently doesn’t see anything at all. Instead, an oblique experience is granted to him. It is better described as a kind of unknowing, rather than knowing. He must leave behind what he has previously observed because this seeing consists in not seeing. That which is sought transcends all knowledge. Or as Dickinson captures it in her poem: ‘The Truth must dazzle gradually Or every man be blind - .’

If this is our predicament – to be the creature who yearns for more, and is perpetually frustrated as a result – that might seem tragic: life as a bad joke. But it’s not. And Dickinson also knows why.

What she realises is that the truth which is beyond us, which is discerned only indirectly, is the only truth that is truly worth seeking. That which we can readily grasp and manipulate is too easy for us. It’s humdrum. It leaves life too small for us, the creature with an eye for the transcendent. But look further, and what you are offered is what she calls truth’s ‘superb surprise’. That’s why success lies in circuit. Our humanity is spoken to, from a direction – a source – that we had not expected. And our humanity expands as a result.

Friday, August 27 2010

AS Byatt, who we are, and maps again

There's a tremendous few minutes with AS Byatt in this short video, particularly from the end of the third minute.

The grande dame of English words is reflecting upon how religion no longer tells her who she is. 'Religion has gone away,' she notes - promising to write about it one day because it's a phenomenon that interests her. 'And all we are left with is ourselves. So we have to be interested in ourselves.' Hence, everything from psychoanalysis to Big Brother.

'The kind of map of the world that was provided by Christian belief, or other forms of religious belief... has for most people in the society I live in gone. And this means, how you say who you are has become very, very difficult.'

This saying of who you are is very different from writing a memoir - this and that happened to me. 'It's to do with how you work out who you are, standing on the earth for a limited period of time.' Which is to say that we no longer have maps - bar say the media, that constantly tells us who we are. But the media is too self-referential. She reflects on Facebook.

‘The word Facebook means it’s a mirror. You’re actually looking for a mirror. And you need a mirror because you haven’t got a picture (of who you are). You need a mirror to tell you who you are... You only exist if you tell people you are there.’

Hence, psychoanalysis, Big Brother, Facebook: this is all a religious matter. And it's the poet Wallace Stevens who helps her make sense of it. He knew that we live in a place that's not our own, and much more not ourselves. His poem The Man with the Blue Guitar captures it:

And they said then, "But play, you must, A tune beyond us, yet ourselves,

A tune upon the blue guitar Of things exactly as they are."

It's an insight that I keep noticing at the moment, the sense that our own lives are too small for us, and we need something more than ourselves to be ourselves. Jung described it as the two parts of the individual - the ego, which makes our particular place in the world; and the self which is our connection to the human collective. Individuation is a synthesis of the two.

It seems that Byatt senses we live in a world that has lots of ego, in Jung's sense, but with the loss of religion, has lost its self, again in Jung's sense. As yet, we don't otherwise know how to connect to it. As a substitute, we look for mirrors that play the ego back to us as if that were 'a tune beyond us, yet ourselves.' Though it's not, of course.

Sunday, August 22 2010

Protesting protest the pope

Two excellent pieces on the Pope, the scandal and the impending visit.

The first, by 'professional atheist' Padraig Reidy on the Guardian's Cif belief on how the rhetoric of the Protest the Pope movement is, in part, become quite as vile as anything in British anti-Catholicism. His implicit message to his erstwhile colleagues: be careful who you pick as your enemy, because you risk becoming quite as unpleasant as you imagine them to be.

Second, a deeply thoughtful piece by Colm Tóibín in the LRB, in which, amongst matters such as why priesthood might be appealing to gay men, and how Catholicism is a culture that can simultaneously know and not know things, he laments the disappearance of a kind of spirituality represented by the previous Pope, when at his best: 'If you did not know anything about the religion he represented, you would say that it was one of the most beautiful ever imagined, wonderfully speculative and exotic, good-humoured and sweet but also exquisite and exalted.'

Tuesday, August 17 2010

Making sense of William Blake

I went to see the new William Blake etchings at Tate Britain over the weekend, and whilst they're tremendous, I was very disappointed with the blurb alongside. So I penned a piece for the Guardian, Cif Belief, having spent the weekend reading Kathleen Raine and Peter Ackroyd. A taster:

Blake loathed the deistic, natural religion associated with Newton and Bacon. He called it "soul-shuddering." Materialism he dismissed as "the philosophy in vogue." He thought the Enlightenment had created a false deity for itself, one imagined by Rousseau and Voltaire as projected human reason. The "dark Satanic mills" of Jerusalem are the mills that "grind out material reality", as Peter Ackroyd writes in his biography of Blake, continuing: "These are the mills that entrance the scientist and the empirical philosopher who, on looking through the microscope or telescope, see fixed mechanism everywhere."

Monday, August 9 2010

Religion and the New Atheism

I've a contribution in this new book:

This book brings together scholars from religious studies, science, sociology of religion, sociology of science, philosophy, and theology to engage the new atheism and place it in the context of broader scholarly discourses. This volume will serve to contextualize and critically examine the claims, arguments and goals of the new atheism so that readers can become more informed of some of the debates with which the new atheists inevitably and, at times unknowingly, engage.

Contributors include Richard Harries, Reza Aslan, Amarnath Amarasingam, Robert Platzner, Jeffrey Robbins, Christopher Rodkey, Rory Dickson, Steve Fuller, William Sims Bainbridge, William A. Stahl, Stephen Bullivant, Michael Borer, Richard Cimino, Christopher Smith, Gregory R. Peterson, Jeff Nall, Ryan Falcioni, and Mark Vernon.

Sunday, July 11 2010

A thought on the significance of Richard Dawkins

You only have to visit richarddawkins.net, or watch the adulation he receives from an appreciative audience, or note how his name has become part of contemporary culture, to suspect that his writings and rhetoric are tapping into something profound. But what?

A number of theories do the rounds. It could be that he has released a long suppressed enmity against religion. It could be that he is a new Huxley, completing what the original 'bulldog' began. It could be that he is, as he's described himself, the 'devil's chaplain.' It could be that he is just the poster boy of a brilliant marketing campaign.

But what about this phrase from Jung: 'The gods have become diseases.'

Jung was following Nietzsche here, who also recognised that when gods die, we humans stay pious. But because that piety no longer has an external object, its passion is internalized, as Nietzsche put it - or introjected, as Jung put it. This is a psychic disaster, as the individual becomes a god to him- or herself. All kinds of neuroses and psychoses follow. (Nietzsche was so brilliant that he named and described his own, in the figure of the superman.) The gods, therefore, become diseases - of the mind.

In a peculiar way, is this not precisely what Dawkins has identifed? In perhaps his most well known metaphor, he refers to religion as a virus. Or there's his notion that belief in gods is an evolutionary misfiring, like a cancer. He has, therefore - and I guess unwittingly - diagnosed the condition of our times. This would be why, love him or loathe him, it is impossible to ignore him.

Doing it my way

I'm instinctively wary of the pic'n'mix approach to belief and spirituality, mostly because I'm quite a pic'n'mixer myself. It's the worry of never engaging the deeper riches of any single practice or way of life, which requires decades to do. And Jung suggests to me that might be right, via his concept of individuation.

By that account, the story of our lives is, first, the establishment of the ego, in the ways of the world; and second, the displacement of the ego by the Self - that wider participation in life, variously referred to as embracing the flow of life, fuller consciousness, the way, God. One needs the other: the Self needs an established ego fully to be in the world; the ego needs the Self to find not just instrumental purpose but ontological meaning.

Today, this rise and then eclipse of the ego is disrupted because the ego may never find the security it needs to first establish itself, what with the multiple choices on offer in the contemporary world: in a plural culture of many ways, and lots of pic'n'mix, it's hard to be committed to one way for long enough. The situation is exacerbated because consumerism celebrates the freedom of the ego - the freedom to experiment with this and then that. In a way, it's fascinating. Though the price is never sinking roots.

However, the Self seeks to make itself known no less. And the result is individuals in a perpetual state of meaning-seeking - we're all visionaries and mystics now - though we all also share a particular characteristic: unlike our forebears who sought meaning too, through their inherited tradition, contemporary seeking is marked by the constant fear that what we seek lies elsewhere. The risk is that instead of a steady process of individuation, we live lives of constant skirmishing between ego and Self. Or to put it another way, the commitment of the New Age is not to 'the way', for who can believe there is a 'the way' anymore; but instead to 'my way'.

Sunday, June 13 2010

The other side of Bertrand Russell

Bertrand Russell has become a poster boy for atheism, and he was against much that passes for religion. But, I suspect he was at heart religious. Just browsing, I came across this in his autobiography: 'The loneliness of the human soul is unendurable, nothing can penetrate it except the highest intensity of the sort of love that religious teachers have preached; whatever does not spring from this motive is harmful, ot at least useless.' What is that if not what can be called a religious stance? Interestingly, he wrote it when in his nineties, as the passion of his life's battles was cooling.

Saturday, June 12 2010

A new solution to the problem of evil?

Those evolutionary psychologists on a mission to unpick religion have been at it again, in a new paper I've written about at Cif Belief. A taster:

'That's surely the message of Job, when God appears at the end and asks the poor man whether he was there when the world was made. To the atheist, that's a shocking pulling of rank. To the theist, it's a final, humble acknowledgment. It doesn't explain evil, and it's not supposed to. (We might not have this problem at all if we spoke Arabic, where apparently people do not say, "I don't know", but, "God knows." In other words, to invoke God is just to confess human ignorance.)'

Tuesday, June 8 2010

Dialogue not evangelisation with the church

The Vatican is setting up a new division to evangelise 'noble' agnostics and atheists. On Cif Belief, I argue that dialogue would be more fruitful, not least for the church. A taster:

'The Vatican will have to acknowledge that it can positively gain from the insights of agnostics and atheists – much, perhaps, as the priests need the prophets in the Hebrew Bible. Without such gadflies, the church becomes sluggish simply on account of its size – to recall the remark that Socrates made about ancient Athens. In other words, the Court of the Gentiles, as the new council is also known, will have to be less about evangelisation, and more about dialogue.'

Wednesday, May 19 2010

On being moved in your bowels

Last night, I did a rare thing for me, offering a reflection in a church, to the Isaiah Community, as below...

I feel a bit of an impostor, stood behind a lectern giving a religious address. It’s not that I haven’t done it before. I used to be an Anglican priest. However, now I’m agnostic about Christianity – though I rather like the phrase Diarmaid MucCulloch has coined, being a ‘candid friend’ of Christianity. You see, we agnostics worry about Christianity too – and for not dissimilar reasons to those I imagine are shared by many here. We know we need it, as much as those of faith need it, for Christianity is the great story of our lives. But we worry that this great story, at least in the west, is not speaking to our humanity as it might do, so as to enlarge it.

It turns out that the subject of friendship itself provides a good case in point. Friendship these days is treated as if it were the easy love, the one that forms the unthinking backdrop of our lives. We’re like the ladies of Sex and the City: during the week, lovers come and go; but at Saturday brunch, friends remain. Or we’re one of the half a billion users of Facebook who, when we’re bored or distracted, can always find a friend online. Or we’re like the vicar who welcomes his congregation on a Sunday with that warm word: ‘Friends.’ But is friendship so straightforward, so unthinking? It’s not what the New Testament would have us think.

Take the story of the Good Samaritan. I thought I understood it, and moreover that we are living in a society that could be said to embody its message to a remarkable degree. In the NHS, for example, care is free at the point of need. That surely is what the Samaritan offered the Jew in the ditch, and what the other two did not. But it was not until I started to think about friendship, and read the rebel Catholic philosopher Ivan Illich, that I saw otherwise. Illich thought that the parable has been subtly misunderstood, and in so doing its meaning has been what he called ‘perverted.’ It’s not about welfarism, he argued. The key detail is the way Luke describes the compassion the Samaritan has for the Jew. The important word is one of those wonderful Greek ones – splankgnizesthi, from Splanknon, the bowels. The Samaritan is moved in his guts. That’s what fundamentally distinguishes him from the priest and the Levite, not that he offers the care.

To the first hearers of the tale it would perhaps have been clearer. The priest and the Levite acted quite reasonably to them: for reasons with which we are still familiar – fear of dirt, fear of moral pollution – to touch a half-dead man would have revolted them. So what would have stood out is how freely the Samaritan behaves. He is able to respond to a human being, although half-dead. He is not worried about himself, or who the Jew is. He is not tied by any kind of convention. He is free to act. It’s freedom that is the basic message of the story, to respond to another human being. And it does not stop there.

For there’s a remarkable quality to the Samaritan’s freedom. He does not tend to the Jew so as to fulfil a duty, but rather to answer a call. He does not tend to the injured man because he feels he ought to, but because he feels it in his guts. It’s a moment of conversion for the Samaritan. And it results not in a change of beliefs, as if he suddenly realised the Jews weren’t so bad after all. Or because it awakens a sense of responsibility. Rather, the conversion results in the formation of a moving relationship. And the best word for that relationship is friendship. Friendship, then, is not easy. It’s the love that does not fear, but it is free – so free it disturbs others. When you start to look, you see there are many other stories in the gospels that tell of it.

Think of the woman who throws a jar of costly ointment on Jesus’ feet. It’d have been embarrassing to be present, on account of the emotional excess, though Jesus was free enough in himself to accept it. And there’d have been the disciples’ complaint: the oil should have been sold, and the money given to the poor. Don’t bother her, Jesus replies. Look at this brief moment of free encounter between two human beings.

Another incident is the calling of the disciples themselves, when everything changes as a result of their liberating encounter with the free man, Jesus. His freedom bred freedom.

And then there’s the record of Jesus’ own friendship with the one whom he loved. What must the other disciples have thought about that? We know that they fought amongst themselves. And we’d perhaps have agreed with them, presuming that John’s friendship with Jesus offends agape love, which should be universal and equal, with no favourites. You’re missing the point, says John. I lay on his breast at the supper because with him I was free.

Illich was also fond of the notion of conspiracy. Conspirators are friends who are free enough to cut across established boundaries, even to the point of causing offence. If you want a current example, look at David Cameron and Nick Clegg. But think of the word conspiracy, coming from the Latin conspiratio. Conspirators are ones who conspire, who breathe together. There’s something strikingly incarnational in that. True friends are those who share the same spirit and the same breath.

My sense is that the early Christian community was so unusual because they were conspirators. They were individuals who were free enough in themselves to become friends regardless of social norms – Jews, Greeks, men, women, slaves and freemen, and so on. A lot of the New Testament references to friendship come in John’s gospel and it’s thought that his community might have been known as friends, before they were known as Christians. It was the quality of the friendship they shared that struck people around them.

The notion was captured in the original significance of the kiss of peace. Up until fairly recently, individuals would share the peace physically, literally risking the stink of each other’s breath. Today we don’t share the kiss of peace, but shake hands. It seems sensible, less challenging. But it’s less free too, and perhaps it risks one of the subtle perversions of Christianity that exercised Illich. For a handshake holds the other at a distance. We can see their eyes, and so assess them. It’s a calculated greeting – not acting freely towards another, but only insofar as is appropriate. It wasn’t the greeting of the good Samaritan.

In fact, a history of the handshake should be written. It would be a very Christian project. The handshake was first introduced, I think, in the late seventeenth century, in England. Visiting Frenchmen found the disappearance of the kiss disturbing, as if an epidemic of distrust was abroad. It seemed profoundly unfriendly. They laughed at the constrained proclivities of the English. Conversely, within a generation or two, Englishmen began to see the liberal practice of two men kissing as a foreign and distasteful act, polluting.

Just how free friendship is can also be seen if you think about the ethics of friendship. In an important sense it’s unethical because it does not follow the dictates of duty or obligation. It cuts across the law, and follows its guts. This characteristic has been noted warily by moral philosophers. Immanuel Kant, for example, thought that there couldn’t be friendship in heaven. It’s too risky. After all, if you allow conspirators to breathe into each others’ mouths, they might form cabals and gangs. Alternatively, if someone says you are my friend, they might also say someone else is not my friend, and perhaps even that someone else again is our enemy. Kant did not like the freedom of friendship and for good reasons. Instead, he hoped that a time would come on earth in which we learnt to treat all equally.

Perhaps he would have regarded the NHS as a step in the right direction. But for all the obvious and massive good the NHS does, it also presents a tremendous risk. It turns the compassion that stirs in your guts into an impersonal machine that must deliver mercy on demand. Instead of friendship, it has targets. It’s free at the point of delivery, but in terms of what it does to relationships, it can be very costly. This is what Illich means by a perversion of Christianity. In the name of a great good, the main point is missed and occluded.

It’s not just welfarism that’s a problem. Think of an issue like justice. On one level, we want to champion justice, for all the obvious reasons. But perhaps we need to rethink that notion too. For justice has become another demand, a set of laws, a right. And it’s notably different to the ancient notion. For Aristotle, justice was, in a sense, failed friendship. When the friends of the ancient city-state went to the courts, they’d lost the sense that they were in it together, in that argumentative enterprise called democracy. They’d forgotten that their good was found with others, that they needed one another. Today, I suspect that our notion of justice quite deliberately pits one person against another, the poor against the rich, the powerless against the powerful. We are ushering in a kingdom of combatants, not a community who are free to be friends.

Note how thoroughly ambivalent these ‘perversions’ are. They are not simply bad. They are corrupting in a more subtle sense. Something is lost – freedom and friendship – and my suspicion is that this is what needs to be rediscovered. It’s not a doing thing – do justice, do caring. It’s a being thing. That’s what is so astonishing about individuals like Nelson Mandela, or Desmond Tutu, or Mother Theresa. What they did and do comes from who they are, like the good Samaritan. And that’s not easy, fundamentally because you need to be free to be like them. For most of us, it’s hard enough to be free enough to encounter someone whom we know and love, let alone someone is unknown, strange and different.

But it matters. In terms of the Christian story, nothing less than the incarnation is at stake – incarnation being another word for love that dwells freely amongst us, that befriends us, that shares our breath.

I, of course, have no easy answers, not being very free myself. Though, I suspect that having easy answers is part of the problem. We need more of a challenge from Christianity than the easy calls in which it can trade, if it’s to speak to our humanity so as to enlarge it. Friendship is one place where that challenge can be worked out afresh and, at the risk of sounding like a preacher, some of the clues are right there in the New Testament, in stories like that of the Good Samaritan. It’d be great if the Isaiah Community could help rediscover such freedom, in the community of friends it seeks to forge. It’ll be hard because there’s a fine line to be pursued in matters like care and justice; and because it’ll depend upon the quality of our freedom with one another; to be friends, as the good Samaritan was with the injured Jew.

Saturday, May 8 2010

ID and blasphemy

The question of the week at Cif Belief has been on whether Intelligent Design is bad theology. I most certainly think it is, as I write here. A taster:

If all that seems too philosophical, then you can turn to William Blake. He mocked Newton's God in the famous image portraying Newton, sitting on some slimy rocks, bending over rolls of diagrams and wielding a compass. The God of ID might be mocked similarly, by portraying The Ancient of Days sniffing and seasoning the prebiotic soup.

Monday, April 19 2010

Writing on the rage

A new book in the God wars genre: Peter Hitchens' The Rage Against God.

It's pitched mostly at his brother, one of the big gun anti-theists, and Christopher Hitchens' leftism - manifest particularly in a nostalgia for Trotsky, which Peter deconstructs pretty effectively as the longing to replace God with humanity is the source of all authority, and build utopias on earth.

Much of the book is taken up with thinking about why Christianity has become so marginal in Britain, a change that Hitchens has witnessed across his lifetime. More than anything else, he puts it down to the two world wars, and the Church of England's alignment with these national causes: after all the horror and the bloodshed, the pews emptied. Add in the decline of empire, and the anxiety about what Britain now is, and the established church inevitably declines and worries about itself too.

He also blames the liberalism if his generation, who feared the constraints of their parents' lifestyles and so pursued new life-goals of unbridled ambition and pleasure, viscerally rejecting anything that smacked of authority and moral judgment.

No doubt, there's much in the analysis. I think he particularly hits the nail on the head when he sees direct parallels between the 'Ditchkins' loathing of religious education as child abuse and the way the Communist system actually did ban religion from schools. Unfortunately, though, Hitchens can't quite control his often moving rhetoric, particularly when it comes to gay folk - whom he doesn't call gay folk, of course, but rather by the dehumanising word 'homosexuals': for him, these are not people who love but individuals who indulge in certain acts. It's an important indictment of his argument, as he otherwise chastises the atheists for dehumanising others.

By the end, you're left with no sense of where we go from here either - bar more of the same decline, accelerated now by militant secular campaigning. So, if you do buy into at least some of his worries about our de-moralised times, as I do, this can serve as no more, or less, than memoir-cum-nostalgia-cum-lament. For a man of faith, he appears to have no faith in the future.

Saturday, April 3 2010

Pullman's appreciative critics

Two more fascinating reviews of Pullman's book by Rowan Williams and Salley Vickers. Both are very appreciative, though the very appreciation allows them to detect subtle but critical weaknesses in the narrative.

Williams's is, in a way, the one you want to read as Pullman's book came out of a conversation with the archbishop. If the new book is Pullman's answer to Williams, the review is Williams's answer back to Pullman.

For Williams, the Jesus of Pullman's earlier chapters feels authentic because he rejects the religious demand for miraculous proof or demonstrative power - until, that is, Gethsemane, when Jesus suddenly rejects God because there has been no heavenly answer. It's a volte face, and that narrative inconsistency, for Williams, is why Pullman's retelling won't actually do, for all its qualities. Pullman is, in effect, demanding the presence of God in a form that he can understand it as a condition for believing in God. Williams is replying that you don't get near the truth of God until you are prepared to let go of all your understanding of/wish-fulfillment for what God might be. And that means being prepared to go through all the apparent absences, even to the point of abandonment on the cross. Only then might you sense 'an energy so immense and unconditioned that there are no adequate words for it' - but only might.

As you'd expect from Williams, it's a fascinating reading of Pullman's book, and points to a quest for the divine that Williams senses Pullman finds compelling, for all his atheism.

I find it compelling too, though I have to say I sensed a hint of a false note in Williams, because it strikes me that the gospels do contain candidates for heavenly answers - perhaps not the miracles, which the evangelists repeatedly say should not be taken as signs, but in the voice of God that is heard at the baptism of Jesus and the heavenly imagery of the transfiguration. It felt a bit too neat for Williams to say that Jesus's apparent sense of abandonment on the cross is actually a 'consequence of his decision to be – in his own person – God's "answer"' - particularly when earlier in his review Williams had complained against 'system-makers'. The abandonment on the cross is the more compelling to me because it can't be made to fit.

Salley Vickers very much values the power of myth because it is a form against ideology: myth is traduced when it is bent to a message. And for all that she values Pullman's story for reminding us of its 'extraordinary power to provoke and disturb', she feels that there are moments of ideology in Pullman's telling. The obvious one is that Gethsemane scene again, when Jesus articulates what is presumably Pullman's own humanist pantheism.

Everyone has their ideologies, of course, so I don't blame Pullman for that. The question is whether you allow them to be critiqued. So I'd love to hear how he responds to Williams's critique. Perhaps he will on Start the Week, this Monday. And how fascinating that the story of Jesus's passion, as opposed to his teaching, is still the stumbling block, for all who engage with the story.

Friday, April 2 2010

Philip Pullman and the myth of Jesus

My piece on Philip Pullman's new novel, The Good Man Jesus and the Scoundrel Christ, is up on the Guardian's Cif. A taster:

As an aside, the notion that Jesus had a twin is not so alien to Christian thought as it might first seem. From the earliest days, Christians believed that alongside the birth of Jesus came the emergence of a character they called Antichrist. The Antichrist has taken on monstrous proportions in the intervening centuries. But originally, Antichrist was almost an identical twin to Jesus, only Antichrist twisted and perverted the gospel, often out of the best of intentions – to make it more manageable or believable. In effect, Pullman doesn’t just retell the story of Jesus, but of Antichrist too.

Sunday, March 21 2010

Group gains for God

Last weekend, I attended a top-up Templeton-Cambridge Journalism Fellowship seminar on Morality: Evolution, Brain & Religion. (I know the blogsphere is strewn with conspiracies about the journalism fellowship, and there are those who think that just to utter the words 'religion' and 'science' in the same sentence is propaganda, but my experience has only been one of independent scholarship, rigorous questioning and the thrill of informed insight.) Amongst others, we had Michael Reiss, Michael Gazzaniga, Herb Gintis and David Sloan Wilson speak with us.

You can watch more or less the same presentation that Gintis gave us on youtube. But it is Wilson's talk that has stuck with me. He is the champion of group selection, and is convinced that evolutionary theory will prove itself fundamental across all the human sciences. Indeed, its public policy implications are already clear enough to act on - something that I suspect Gazzaniga and Reiss would question. (Gazzaniga's the lead researcher on whether brain scan evidence should be admitted in US courts, and told us it'll be another 25 years before the science is ready - a long time in science.)

Group selection is the idea that what is good for the group gets selected for because it enables members of the group to survive better. It's a notion that has been fiercely contested by biologists from the 'selfish gene' school. Wilson is critical of Richard Dawkins in particular, for becoming unaccountable on account of his fame - though he also has a 'truth and reconciliation' process to bridge the divides at ScienceBlogs.

The notion encapsulates multilevel selection (individual, kin, altruistic, group...); Wilson stresses the local nature of adaption (there may be many solutions to a single evolutionary problem); and whilst it's not easy for between-group selection to dominate within-group selection, when it does the species tends to take off (witness the human animal, that shows extraordinary trust in strangers.)

It leads to all kinds of fascinating possibilities. There's the link between cooperation and cognition - intelligence arising because of the need to negotiate the ups and downs of living together. Wilson also argues that evolution can happen very fast, not only via culture but via genes. So next time you hear a story about how we are essentially stone age creatures trying to live in a silicon age world, ignore it: evolutionary psychology based upon stasis since the Pleistocene misses all the action in between. Though a convinced atheist, Wilson is remarkably interested in religion - religions great and small providing fine-grained case studies of the local adaptions that interest him. He's written about groups from the Jains to the Hutterites (mention of which sent me running to the Chambers Dictionary of Beliefs and Religions I edit to check there was an entry: there is.)

Wilson speaks with all the intensity of someone who wants to convince. Perhaps it's an adaption after all the years he's spent facing down the opposition. But I have to confess that I can understand why some evolutionists are nervous of it.

For one thing, it is open to Popper's accusation of pseudo-science - which is to say, it seems impossible to think of a piece of empirical evidence that could falsify it.

Wilson showed us a slide of the schema he uses to understand religious traits. A trait can either be an adaption or a non-adaption. If it's an adaption, it might be the product of group selection (self-sacrifice, say), individual selection (perhaps the golden rule - you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours), or parasitic selection (hanging around, like a spandral.) If it's not an adaption, then it must be either one from a previous stage of evolution (perhaps the 'superstitious scientist' is an example here), a by-product of a trait from a non-religious context (attributing natural forces to the action of gods), or a piece of evolutionary driftwood (just there by chance.) This covers off all bases, and its very comprehensiveness is a weakness for Popper, since there's no trait that could fall outside it's scope, by definition.

I asked Wilson about this, and his justification is basically a priori: everything is the product of evolution, so it's not surprising that there's a theoretical framework that can account for it all.

A second, related issue is whether forcing all aspects of religion into an evolutionary frame leads to as many just so stories - Gould's complaint, that there just isn't the evidence to support all the hypotheses. Wilson's reply was that whilst it might be a sin to see an adaption when there isn't one, it's also a sin not to see an adaption when there is one. You've got to proceed on a case by case basis and assess likelihood.

The stress on the local nature of adaptions - the many proximate mechanisms that might solve the ultimate problem - seems problematic too. On the one hand, if a proximate mechanism is so specific that it's best talked about in theological, historical or political but not evolutionary terms - for the same reason that a chemist mostly uses the language of chemistry, not physics - then it might be hard to see just what evolution brings to the party beyond vague truisms: 'it's all to do with adaptation' would be as empty as the physicist saying of chemistry 'it's all physics, really.' Evolution is, in a sense, talking itself out of a job.

On the other hand, the converse insistence that evolution must have the determinative thing to say - so that in the field of religion, the theological or spiritual explanation is treated as but a footnote - runs the risks of evolution explaining something by explaining all its distinctive features away. The ultimate mechanism dissolves the very proximate mechanisms that initiated the study.

Wilson has an introductory paper discussing such things on the Evolutionary Religious Studies site. He's someone to watch if you're interested in these things.

Sunday, March 14 2010

The new radical religious

I've a piece on Cif Belief talking about meeting Samir Selmanovic, one of a new type of pluralist evangelicals. A taster:

'Aren't there plenty of quotes in the Bible that claim exclusivity, I ask – not least when Jesus says he's the way, truth and life? Selmanovic points out that the context of that saying shows that Jesus was not reflecting on how to live in a plural world but was offering comfort to his disciples. OK, I continue: what about the fundamental differences between religions, such as Christianity, which asserts that salvation comes from God, and Buddhism which asserts that enlightenment comes by your own efforts? Selmanovic argues that contradictions are inevitably apparent to us, as we have no divine "view from nowhere". But "contradictions today become treasures tomorrow". Admit that, and you raise the possibility differences might not be as profound as we think.'

Thursday, March 11 2010

The new Buddhist humanism

Stephen Batchelor has a new book out, Confession of a Buddhist Atheist. A fascinating read it is too - and endorsed by Christopher Hitchens. I've a piece on Cif Belief. A taster:

'Epstein sees Batchelor's contributions as part of a trend in contemporary humanism, one he calls the "new humanism". It's a humanism that focuses not so much on assertions and campaigns, as on an attempt to forge a humanly nourishing way of life. When I ask him, Epstein is nervous of the word "spiritual", though he's keen that organised humanism does more than just "sitting around and philosophising." He himself came to humanism after studying Buddhism. He practices meditation. He tells me that Batchelor's bold attempts to remake Buddhism are appreciated in American humanist circles. There is a hunger for it, he explains, from those who recognise the need for community and ritual. A practice of meditation can provide both: community via the concept of sangha – coming together with a common intent or purpose; ritual by the regular need to practice.'

Friday, March 5 2010

The agnostic condition

Whilst in the US, I've searched out kindred souls - other religiously-inclined agnostics trying to write about it. Meeting Lisa Webster and Nathan Schneider, of Religion Dispatches and Killing the Buddha respectively, has been particularly good. Lisa calls herself a pious agnostic - perhaps echoing Nietzsche's thought that even after the death of god, we are all still pious; Nathan a critic of religion - appreciative, like music critic, as well as in the more deconstructive sense. Both ascriptions seem to fit well with my more clunking religiously-inclined agnostic.

Three reflections have been clear to me from our conversations.

1. The necessity of community Killing the Buddha was formed explicitly to provide a virtual place for individuals to come together with committed goodwill, though not necessarily agreement, to discuss, test, take risks, explore. Though I often have conversations with people who are religiously 'in between', a community is so valuable because of its sustained nature. I must do more about that aspect. It's important.

2. The question of practice Practice involves more than just rational argument - it must engage body, mind and spirit. My main practice would be writing, which is not just pure word production, of course, but includes thinking and struggling; and embodied aspects too, like silence and traveling. The blog contributes here - the attempt to crystallize moments and thoughts on the way.

3. The sense of purpose The story I tell myself is of how we live in a moment of uncertainty. (Perhaps all moments are uncertain, but anyway). Our times seem spiritually unsettled, as factors from consumerism to pluralism to materialism press in on every side. Emotional and fundamentalist versions of belief - religious and scientific - are all reactions against the uncertainty, though to my mind they miss the opportunity of now.

It can all be exhausting, but thrilling too - particularly when you meet kindred souls.

Friday, February 5 2010

Who was Jesus?

Debate going on at Cif Belief's new book club, discussing A.N. Wilson's book, Jesus.

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