Silence is like forgiveness. Many would say it’s a lovely idea, until they have to do it (to borrow a line from C.S. Lewis). Or more provocatively, could there be a cultural conspiracy around silence, as if the powers-that-be would prefer that we did not do it? After all, the silent person is a dangerous person. They have thoughts of their own.
Diarmaid MacCulloch, Professor of the History of the Church at Oxford University, is developing something of reputation for making scholarly jibes at the tradition he has so extensively studied. He has remarked that the conversion of England in the sixth century was prompted by Pope Gregory falling for the fair-haired “angels” from these islands, when they appeared in the Roman slave market. Funny, MacCulloch noted, that the church is now so troubled by same-sex affections. Then, in his TV series, How God Made the English, he argued that the established church defends the place of all faiths in society, not because the Church of England has long championed tolerance, but because historically it has been so intolerant. It has learnt the lesson the best way, that is, the hard way.
Now, in his Gifford Lectures, delivered last month and available online, he has turned his mind to silence. The lectures present a lively history of silence in the church, and left me with a clear sense that this is a history that effects us all today.
A suspicion of silence took root in the second and third centuries, when bishops penned diatribes against the so-called gnostikoi, Christians who claimed that God was most fully known as unknowable, and so therefore in silence. To be branded a gnostic was to be cast out of the fold. Then, in the fourth century, came the conversion of Constantine. The church aligned itself to secular power and now what you thought was of political importance too. Thereafter, western rites included creeds to be audibly confessed. They policed who was in and who out.
The legacy of this tradition is that, today, if you go to a mass or morning worship, there will be barely a moment’s silence. Quakers aside, it is as if there is a de facto ban on silence in public worship. When people gather together, they should rehearse approved truths. The inner life, left alone, foments heresy and subversion.
Related is the widespread assumption that to be a Christian is to give your assent to truth statements: you go to church not because you are searching but because you believe.
The legacy seems to have shaped powerful secular traditions too, such as empiricism or behaviourism. They work on the principle that if manifest evidence cannot be produced in support of human experience, the experience is either extraneous or deluded.
The loss of silence is becoming what might be called a mission issue. Take the growing popularity of Western Buddhism. It is, I suspect, partly a reaction. Buddhism encourages the individual to train in silent practices that take the inner life seriously. This appeals to contemporary individualism and, further, such Buddhism naturally adopts the insights of psychology and so befriends modern science, unlike Christianity that appears to be locked in fights over publicly agreed truths.
MacCulloch highlights the fate of Evagrius Ponticus. (Who? you might ask. Quite.) The fourth century monk was one of the first Christians systematically to chart the inner life, describing the difficult thoughts that the individual would face as they journeyed inwards – unruly passions including lust, anger, sloth and pride. The hope was that the individual might come to understand their feelings and so be freer of them.
If that sounds rather like mindfulness meditation, which eases the individual away from the snares of discursive thought and the depression and anxiety that can result, it is because the insight is essentially the same. The tragedy for the church is that Evagrius was branded a gnostic. His exploration of human inwardness was transformed into the Seven Deadly Sins. Subtle inner guidance was brought under strict ecclesiastical control.
So, once again, MacCulloch’s intervention is timely. Noisy Christianity is alive and kicking. For individuals who feel the allure of silence, it is off-putting and irrelevant. They might never know that there are profound, useful meditative traditions in Christianity too.
I've noticed a couple of Templeton events in the last week or two. One was a forum at the British Academy in London, bringing together previous Templeton Prize winners who have been Gifford Lecturers too. The seven - including Martin Rees, Charles Taylor and Freeman Dyson - mused on what had changed since their lectures and what might be next for science and religion.
For what it's worth, I think Freeman Dyson is particularly worth listening to. He argued that the universe might be analog not digital, as might our brains, which would explain why AI never really takes off. He also noted that first rate sci-fi has more to say about the meaning of things than second rate science. Here's a clip:
Also, Templeton is relaunching its Big Questions Online site. I've written for it before, and note good questions coming up, such as whether information is the basis of reality and whether we are hard-wired to experience awe. A new feature is the option to join in the conversation, which no doubt many people will...
By Mark Vernon on Thursday, June 14 2012, 15:10 - Journalism
The new edition of The Idler is out now, examining utopias. I've an essay on Plato's much misunderstood, I reckon, Republic. It begins:
Karl Popper almost did it for Plato, when he published The Open Society in 1962. A central plank of Popper’s defence of freedom was a fierce attack on what he called ‘utopian social engineering’. He cast Plato as the originator of a form of totalitarian politics that in the twentieth century threatened the whole world, in the form of the Marxist regime of the Soviet Union. In short, Plato was an armchair Stalin. The ancient Greek philosopher was responsible for nurturing the dream of all subsequent dictators, that they could design an ideal state that would never decay.
Never mind that when Popper wrote The Open Society he did not have to hand a decent translation of Plato’s key text, the Republic, as he admits in his autobiography, Unended Quest. Or that ‘what I read was determined largely by what books I could get in New Zealand’, which was limited because of the war. Subsequent generations of English-speaking philosophers have picked up the main drift and tended to follow Popper’s line. Plato’s invention of the genre of utopian political writing was a dangerous mistake. It could be said to be indirectly responsible for the deaths of millions. Certainly any freedom-loving liberal, who might feel compelled to read the Republic as an historical artefact, should do so mostly so as to marshal arguments against it.
Poor Plato. The fundamental devices he uses to frame his seminal political discussion are ignored or forgotten. Just to note that he always wrote in the form of dialogues, never in his own voice, should be enough. It was his apparently failed attempt to ensure that his readers would not lift philosophy from the page, like the fundamentalist does theology from a sacred book, but would engage with his interlocutors and cultivate wisdom in their own life. John Stuart Mill described the process well in his political pamphlet, On Liberty. Plato produced brilliant discussions of the great questions of philosophy and life, Mill writes, ‘to the purpose of convincing anyone who had merely adopted the commonplaces of received opinion that he did not understand the subject.’ Plato’s political writings, like his other work, are designed to guard against social engineering by relentless exposing the folly of human ignorance.
In fact, it is only relatively recently that the Republic has been interpreted as if it were Plato’s premier political work. It seems that it was adopted by the Victorian public school system as an ur-text for the young men who were being trained to govern the empire. They had the Bible to shape their souls and the Republic to hone their leadership.
Before then, the Republic had been treated as an exercise in fantasy politics, an attempt to expose what is at stake in political philosophy, rather than as an attempt to write a manifesto upon which Plato might, as it were, stand for election to office. In that former sense, it has been very successful, not least since the ideas about justice, education and the good that it contains are still discussed millennia later. Additional evidence about the correct way to read the Republic is found in the fact that it actually contains very little discussion of the day-to-day business of government. You might say that it is deliberately not practical. Further still, Plato has one of his characters comment that such a city-state as they have been describing will never, in actually, be found. But the literalism of twentieth century Anglo-American analytic philosophy appears to be such that even a warning like that is met with bemusement and, then, overlooked.
Of the many grim details emerging from the trial of Anders Behring Breivik, an unexpected twist appeared in Norway's Verdens Gang newspaper. The director of the Ila prison, where Breivik may spend the rest of his days, described how the mass murderer could be supplied with "professional friends". They would play indoor hockey with him, or chess.
The Norwegian prison service is faced with a conundrum. On on the one hand, Breivik cannot be trusted with other prisoners because of security fears; on the other, it is not prepared to leave him languishing in isolation. Specially trained companions may be the solution.
This will seem offensively shocking or unsettlingly admirable, depending upon your view of state punishment and incarceration. But consider, for the sake of argument, that it is a dramatic example of brave prison idealism. By trying to make Breivik's life behind bars liveable, as opposed to locking the door and throwing away the key, it is not giving up on the possibility that he may reform.
The opposite stance prevails in countries that have the death penalty for murder. Take the United States, where state execution is remarkably persistent for all its enlightenment values. In an essay for the London Review of Books, Thomas Lacquer concluded that the American death penalty had little to do with punishment or justice. It simply failed to deliver on either count. Instead, he argued that a "primordial sacrificial logic" was at play. Like a scapegoat designated to carry away the sins of the many, killing those who commit atrocities reassures the community that the moral order is not fundamentally flawed. Capital punishment is a rite of purification.
Similarly, some may feel that Breivik has committed acts so heinous that his continuing existence – and certainly happy existence – offends the moral order. Sacrifice may seem the only option, the opposite of supplying prison friends.
But think of it this way. Implicit in Breivik's perverse ideology is a quest for an imagined purity, of a racist kind. By punishing but not scapegoating, and in fact caring for Breivik, Norway is setting itself above his purity games. The state will not follow the sacrificial logic.
There is a second related conundrum embedded in the story, too. It might be put like this. Are there not cases, particularly terrible crimes, when justice itself is not enough? Something more is required if the horror is to be redeemed.
This struck me when reading about the work of Nic Dunlop. He tracked down Comrade Duch, the head of the Khmer Rouge's secret police, a man responsible for the murder of more than 20,000 people. However, at the end of his journey, following a grisly trail of torture and death, what Dunlop found took him by surprise. It was not so much justice, as understanding.
Duch turned out to be a pathetic figure, apparently contrite a few decades on. "As long as he remains a human being," Dunlop concludes, "and that's what I found, there is hope."
It is as if a different imperative comes through when no practical justice can do justice to the horror that has happened. It needs to be viewed from a place beyond good and evil. The events must be known, but without destroying hope. Only then can human beings who have suffered much have the chance of living well. It is a kind of forgiveness, which might be defined as the capacity to have a future in spite of the past.
It is surely too soon for that for Breivik's victims. But perhaps deep in the Norwegian prison system's collective unconscious lies the hope that, one day, it may not be. Compassion for the perpetrator as well as the victims helps hold on to that brave possibility.
By Mark Vernon on Friday, May 18 2012, 08:44 - Journalism
I've a review of John Polkinghorne's Science and Religion In Quest of Truth in the new TLS. The full piece is behind a paywall, I think, or of course the newspaper is on all good bookstands. The second half of the review casts an eye to the future of the science and religion debate...
[Polkinghorne] briefly but carefully makes the case for an understanding of the unpredictability of quantum physics that is ontologically intrinsic, the so-called Copenhagen interpretation. He argues for a similar kind of intrinsic unpredictability in relation to chaos theory. Put them together and this implies that reality might have an ‘open grain’ rather than a closed causal tightness. He speculates – acknowledging the boldness – that this might make room for ‘novel additional causal principles… beyond those described by conventional physics.’ Several possibilities relevant to science and religion would follow.
First, that there is no reason to assume that science has the last say on the nature of reality. There is a ‘need for humble realism about what science can actually tell us about the character of causal process,’ he writes, noting that scientism is ‘overblown’. Second, that there is plenty of scope for a notion of top-down as well as bottom-up causation. Indeed, explicating a general theory of the emergent phenomena that are best described top-down might turn out to be one of the triumphs of twenty-first century science. At the moment, scientists are still collecting cases, like nineteenth century naturalists collecting specimens.
Further, it could be that the scientific concept of information is key – information defined as the specification of dynamic patterns of large-scale orderly behaviour. That, in turn, might become enriched so as to offer a new understanding of the nature of personhood: perhaps personhood will come to be thought of as a continuously developing ‘information-bearing pattern’ carried by the constantly changing biology of the body. This pattern or form, which starts to look not unlike the Aristotelian conception of the soul, would incorporate memories alongside everything else that constitutes a person.
Then, there could be further possibilities, to do with God’s action in the world. Divine providence might come to be described as the ‘input of pure information’, a cosmic level dynamic patterning, analogous to the strange attractor of chaos theory that constrains and directs though without physical or energetic exchange.
By Mark Vernon on Monday, May 14 2012, 11:30 - In the news
I was just at the press conference with the Dalai Lama, organised before he receives the Templeton Prize 2012 this afternoon in St Paul's Cathedral, London.
It was inevitably a little frustrating: journalists think in headlines, so I just shouldn't expect an in-depth exploration of science and spirituality, much as it would be fascinating to get deeper into the now commonplaces His Holiness champions in the west - the honesty, truthfulness, warm-heartedness that builds an inner self-confidence and peace of mind, for all the pain that life throws up. It's only when you think that life should be easy that you get frustrations and violence, he remarked. We need to research the causes of events like the economic crisis, he said in response to another question, and not just the economic causes but the moral causes too.
The main theme on the science and spirituality front was that the psychologists with whom he has worked (Daniel Goleman and Richard Davidson were on the panel too) have gained useful insights from Buddhist psychology that they have then explored in a scientific frame. Plus, the Dalai Lama's very presence in debates about mental health catalyzes all sorts of interest across the scientific community. This was the significance of his presence at the 2005 meeting of America's Society for Neuroscience.
And perhaps it's the presence that counts most of all. He is disarmingly direct, attentive, undefended, even in front of a bunch of sceptical journalists seeking a headline. That felt remembrance of time with him perhaps matters more than anything he actually says. It communicates a certain way of being human, not otherwise conspicuously evident in the world today. Call it divinity, saintliness, or just happiness. It's arresting and inspiring.
I asked Daniel Goleman afterwards how to think about the relationship between science and spirituality, not least as many scientists might think the two are opposed, or at least regard the spiritual element as a colourful surplus. What is lost when insights from religious or spiritual traditions are stripped from that setting and reconstructed in the secular sphere?
He said there were losses and gains. The gains are the insights that might be applied to develop discrete interventions, particularly in a therapeutic context. Mindfulness and CBT together are shown to be particularly potent, for example, when tackling depression.
But that is not to say the spiritual quest inherent in Buddhism or Christianity is not worthwhile. It is just that the science is not interested in it - is theologically blind, in a way.
(As an aside, I was struck again by how much Christianity disables itself by presenting itself as a belief system, not a practice, such as you find in Western Buddhism. The beliefs matter in Buddhism, of course; but they are typically seen as the summary of a life's experience, not the necessary starting point and hence obstacle, as so much talk about the need for conversion implies amongst Christians.)
I do wonder how much the holistic context of a religious way of life matters. Isn't the western, secular way of life itself responsible for so much ill health, and so doesn't that have to change? After all, mindfulness is just one element out of eight in Buddhism. Or in Christianity, you have the daily effort to shift your attention towards others and God too.
But I guess you can't force it. Perhaps the science is simply at the stage of helping us realize that Aristotle, Jesus and/or the Buddha were right all along, more or less. Western culture must find its way, make its own mistakes - manifest in the pain and joys of a million individual lives. If we sense the need for the spiritual dimension, then it won't be lost.
By Mark Vernon on Thursday, May 10 2012, 09:09 - Journalism
Written about 380BC, Plato's Republic is still our blueprint for thinking about the relationship between justice and the state. But who exactly is the "philosopher king" that Plato envisages? Did he really advocate infanticide? And who will "guard the guardians"?
We expect marriages to get rocky and families to provoke pain. But friends tend to be presented in a mostly happy light: think Sex and the City, or Friends. Bumps and scrapes between Samantha and Charlotte are in the plot but only so they might be resolved. Lovers come and go. Friends remain.
This idealisation does not help us in real life, where friendships do not just have entertaining ups and downs, but disturbing fights and bitter endings. Such a reality is demonstrated in new research based on data collected from the Mass Observation Project, just published in The Sociological Review.
Prof Carol Smart and her colleagues argue that some friends can be dumped quite easily. These are "simple friendships" – people we know for fun, say, so when the fun ceases the relationship is dropped or drifts away. But "complex friendships" – people to whom we were close, as soulmates – prove more distressing.
One woman is typical when she confessed that she stuck with an old friend out of responsibility: 'I have an ongoing friendship with a divorced man … who is a good friend in many ways, but who can be very overbearing, loud and insensitive … and he has an anxiety problem. I am sorry for him but find myself totally drained after a day in his company.'
The idealisation of friendship comes through in the research too. Some insisted that you should not abandon old friends, ever. "I'm loyal towards my friend," said one participant, before admitting: "This sounds awful, but I don't get a lot out of the friendship any more." Another person made the arresting observation that the way someone talks about their friends opens a window into the soul, "through which a person's moral calibre could be assessed".
Interestingly, the research advises caution when it comes to reconnecting with old friends. Meeting college or childhood friends can "call up the ghost of former selves, causing regret, embarrassment and discomfort".
Part of the problem is that friendship has no institutionalised life course. When you fall in love, you will think about moving in, about engagement, about marriage, about children, about divorce, about how to get along with your ex. The pathway is not trekked by everyone, of course. But the marital pattern provides a template against which to chart your love life, even when you honour it in the breach. Further, the institutional nature of marriage and marriage-like relationships means that help can be sought when things go wrong.
Not so with friendship because the course of a friendship has no such pattern or support. That is part of its appeal, in fact – friendship as the relationship of freedom. You did not choose your family. You realise that you had little conscious sense of why you chose your lover, once the romance quietens. But you did choose your friends, apparently. And then something goes wrong. You are left floundering.
Perhaps there should be friendship counselling too. It would recognise that friendship is vital to human wellbeing because this form of human love gets under our skin quite as much as any other, for good and ill. But in the meantime, the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche has a useful metaphor to offer.
He knew a thing or two about amity's calamities, having once been a friend of Wagner. The experience of the break-up seems to have led Nietzsche to develop the notion of "star friendship".
Stars are distant, like the friendships of yesteryear. They look bright, as you remember the good times. But the great thing about stars is that they don't cast a shadow over you now. So too might old friendship, once a blessing, now broken. It is not easy to find the place where they don't cast a shadow of guilt or bitterness or loss. But the star metaphor might keep you headed in a better direction. It holds out the hope that one day you will wake up and realise that you're over the friendship, it was good, and all will be well.
Is it just me or has the dialogue between science and religion become a bit stale? I thought as much recently while taking part in a conference on the debate. We were all so well defended in our respective corners – atheists, believers, agnostics. It seemed highly unlikely that what anyone said would seriously unsettle anyone else.
The smart and articulate apologists for theism were easily able to accommodate the challenges materialist science throws at faith. The smart and articulate atheists seemed content to accept the limits of the scientific worldview and not really be challenged by the insights of theology.
Something similar troubled me when I was asked to write The Big Questions: God for the series from Quercus (and indulge me if I add, out this week). Many of the contemporary big questions in theology arise from the impact of modern science, so could I find anything new to say? Well, I did find some new names to read, and while not often cited, I think they might yet find that their time will come.
One was the great German polymath Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. His place in the history of science is secure, having discovered that human beings possess an intermaxillary bone. Animals had long been known to possess this anatomical feature of the jaw. But in Goethe's day, there was a lively science-and-religion-type dispute as to whether human beings did too. The leading anatomist Petrus Camper denied it and further argued that this demonstrated that human beings were different from animals. Eventually, though, Goethe's research won the day.
It proved to be no trivial discovery but inspired the concept of homology, the study of anatomical features across different species. This proved crucial for Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. We have four limbs because our fish ancestors had four fins, and so on. What is interesting to reflect on now, though, is the means by which Goethe did his science.
His trouble with Camper alerted him to fashions in science – fashions that scientists find difficult to shake off because their reputations are likely to have been secured by those fashions. He was also convinced that good science embraces a subjective as well as objective dimension. This is because what scientists see in the natural world depends upon what they are prepared to contemplate seeing. He was prepared to contemplate the human intermaxillary bone. It demonstrated to him that imagination matters as much as investigation.
By imagination, Goethe meant something more than practical ingenuity or empirical creativity. He meant the capacity to discern the living world in all its aspects. Materialism, for example, does not. It treats the living world as a dead mechanism.
Annie Dillard explores the implications in her essay Teaching a Stone to Talk. She describes a man called Larry who is trying to listen to stones speaking. It seems mad but, Dillard asks, is not that hope what secretly drives the scientific impulse? Meteorologists record the wind's speed, but were they drawn to science because once they also heard the wind's cry? Geologists assess the age of stones, but do they sometimes also hear them "shout forth praise"? "What is the difference between a cathedral and a physics lab?" asks Dillard. "Are they not both saying: Hello?"
Popular science routinely trades on this sense of nature's aliveness. If you saw Brian Cox's TV series Wonders of the Universe you may recall how images of the cosmos were accompanied by the rising swell and celebratory trumpets of orchestral music. In fact, the producers received a number of complaints from viewers about the music being too loud. They could not hear Cox explain the hard science as he wistfully gazed heavenwards. And yet, you could be forgiven for concluding that the music was more important. It spoke more loudly and clearly to the meaning of being made of stardust. The music interpreted the physics for us. It made the stones speak. That is the sound we wanted to hear.
Another writer who has explored the power of the imagination in our engagement with the world is Owen Barfield. A philologist, he was fascinated by how words change their meaning over time. Take a word like "literal". Today it means straightforward or on the face of it. But when Saint Augustine, for example, wrote The Literal Meaning of Genesis, the last thing he read was that the world was created in six days. Literal then meant the true meaning, which could only be discerned by struggling with the text, as you might a poem.
The flattening out of the word "literal" is just one instance of a trend that Barfield detected across modern English. He proposed that it is tied up with materialism's mechanistic worldview. It flattens our imagination, thereby also deadening our experience of connection and meaning. Unlike our ancestors, we struggle to hear the stones speak.
Barfield argued that we need to recover our full imaginative capacities if we are deeply to know that the world is alive. Matter, he believed, would then be seen for what it once was, as an expression of spirit. ("Matter" is linked to "mater", or mother, remembered in the expression, mother earth.) This might not be so difficult to achieve because, actually, we experience it every day. When you perceive the matter called a human being speaking, you spontaneously know those perceptions as one person communicating with you, another person. You do not have a theory of other minds, as some philosophers have proposed, driven by a flattening scientistic ideology. We know such matter as spirited people – as souls, you might say.
The paradox that Goethe highlights is that materialism understands itself to be the champion of empiricism, when really it detaches us from the world as we experience it, in the name of objectivity. "All theory, dear friend, is grey," he wrote. "But the golden tree of actual life springs ever green."
Perhaps then, this is the problem with the contemporary dialogue between science and religion. Theology has felt obliged to secure a place for itself broadly within the materialist worldview, sensing its main task is apologetic. But perhaps the time is coming for thinkers to be braver, to push for a truer contemplation of nature, one that knows its aliveness, its spirit. Goethe and Barfield, to name just two, offer rich, imaginative resources.
'He is, quite simply, one of the few writers in England today who really understands the impulse to religious belief and how a faithless age can respond. There are few others I trust to bring such intelligence and sympathy to these issues.' Madeleine Bunting, The Guardian
Religion’s 20 biggest questions answered in accessible and thought-provoking mini-essays.
Fundamentalism, fanaticism, fights. Headlines in the press often cast religion in a bad light. In fact, the evidence suggests otherwise; all in all, the practices of faith tend to have positive effects on people’s lives.
The impact has been assessed across a number of metrics. For example, the likelihood that an individual will drink excessively or take drugs decreases significantly if they go to church, temple or mosque. Among Americans – where religiosity has been extensively studied – being actively religious means you are less likely to commit crime, get divorced, commit suicide or suffer from depression. You will probably also be healthier and live longer.
The upbeat message sounds clearly in positive psychology too, the discipline known as the science of happiness. Martin Seligman, the US psychologist who has put positive psychology on the map, argues that lasting levels of happiness can be influenced by changing your life. “Becoming religious” is in his top five things to do. These results are echoed by the economist, Professor Richard Layard, who advised the last Labour Government on well-being. In his 2005 book, Happiness: lessons from a new science, he presented evidence that having no faith had a more detrimental impact on happiness than losing a job, though not quite as bad as being widowed.
It reads as if the science was designed for advertising God. But the evidence becomes more complicated when a further, crucial question is asked. Just why is it that religion has positive effects? A range of possibilities are mooted, and hotly contested.
A first possibility assigns efficacy to the proscriptive character of religion. World faiths carry moral weight, which is to say that they encourage, if not insist, that faithful adherents do not do things like take drugs, commit crimes and practice infidelity.It is certainly the case that commandments, in the form of “thou shalt not”, are important. They set a tone, help sustain attitudes. But, as any honest believer will testify, commandments are often honoured in the breach. So the question needs to be asked: how it is that proscriptions actually work, in so far as they do?
The story of the founding of Alcoholics Anonymous is illuminating. In 1931, the psychologist Carl Jung was trying to treat an alcoholic, though Roland H’s craving for drink remained stubbornly strong. Then Jung had an idea. He recommended that Roland attend the meetings of an evangelical Christian movement which stressed submission to God. It worked. Roland had a conversion experience, which Jung interpreted as releasing a new source of energy from his patient’s unconscious, one more powerful than the desire to drink. Roland related the experience to another apparently hopeless alcoholic, Bill W, and it worked for him too. He founded AA, which today has more than two million members in 150 countries.
Research on the effectiveness of the 12-step AA programme is disputed. But it seems undeniable that the recognition of a “higher power” was crucial to the success it has had. In other words, proscriptions work not when they are perceived as persecutory commandments but rather when they are perceived as charting a path to a new way of life.
Speaking personally, I have a friend who regularly attends AA meetings, though he is not a churchgoer. But the language of conversion makes eminent sense to him. He pointed me to the literature of Narcotics Anonymous, which expresses it well. “For our group purpose there is but one ultimate authority: a loving God as he may express himself in our group conscience.” And yet, this only points to another knotty issue in the debate. It has to do with the significance of groups.
An alternative possibility to prohibitions being the secret of religion’s success is that individual well-being is boosted by the social support provided in groups – and not just religious groups, but family groups, common interest groups or therapeutic groups. Could the group aspect be what helps people at AA meetings and benefits people who go to church? As the psychologist Oliver James recently noted in The Guardian: “It is … plausible that the comradeship and feeling of belonging supplied by religious peers are a substitute for the buzz you get from substances.” James conceded, however, that social support does not provide an adequate explanation. He cited a large-scale study that tracked the lives of thousands of Americans and concluded that community was not a substantial mediator of inner strength.
There are other possibilities. Richard Layard has suggested that the benefits of religion have little to do with prohibitions or sociality but, rather, the issue is emotional habits. He argues that religious practices train individuals to control their feelings.
In his book on happiness, Professor Layard discussed The Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola, noting how the saint sought to nurture several attitudes that modern science has demonstrated are essential for well-being. Ignatius urged his readers to praise God, that is, to learn to be grateful. He believed that humankind was made to serve God, which had the effect of dissolving egoism by drawing attention away from yourself. As Layard also pointed out, Ignatius argued that salvation involves being indifferent to what happens to you, so while everyone has times of desolation, it is also the case that such experiences tend to pass. This too can help, by building resilience.
Resilience is a theme that interests Eric Greitens, an American humanitarian and social entrepreneur currently researching the virtue. Early indications of his work suggest that individuals who demonstrate resilience in the face of life’s difficulties cannot simply bounce back because their harsh experiences become part of them. Instead, they are able to live with the distress in such a way that they can ascribe meaning to it. The experiences do not demean them, but deepen their sense of being human.
Again, this is an attitude embedded in spiritual traditions. Julian of Norwich lived through the Black Death, one of the most devastating plagues in history, and yet she was still able to write, “All shall be well and all shall be well and all manner of thing shall be well.”
Many of the researchers in the positive psychology field are searching for ways of reformulating such religious attitudes for a secular age. They exhibit a desire to raid religious traditions for their wisdom, while removing the theological scaffolding that has traditionally supported them. One of the most articulate recent attempts is found in the latest book by philosopher Alain de Botton, Religion for Atheists, published earlier this year. In it, he agrees with the positive psychologists that religious practices provide useful techniques for everything from building humane communities to tending attitudes of kindness.
But reading de Botton’s book crystallised in my mind something crucial about religion that is overlooked. It will come as no surprise to believers that this something has to do with God. Positive psychology is characterised by its instrumentality. Alain de Botton puts it explicitly: “Religions are intermittently too useful, effective and intelligent to be abandoned to the religious alone.” What he misses, is that religions are good at building community and nurturing kindness because, paradoxically, they do not aim directly to do either. Rather, they aim to open adherents to that source of life, or spiritual sustenance, that is expansive of our humanity. They offer practices that, over time, transform the soul. It is variously called salvation, eternal life or enlightenment.
Goodwill and well-being may follow. They also may not. But when they do, they are happy by-products of the main task, which is not actually to have a successful life. It is to come to know God. The spiritual dimension has instrumental effects; but without the vertical striving, religious virtues come to feel empty. To whom are you expressing gratitude for life if not God? The blind mechanisms of evolution? Or, it might be noted that you do not become religious in order to be happy, and if you tried to do so the strategy would fail you.
It is striking that atheistic writers and researchers are coming to a new appreciation of religion. Going are the days when faith could simply be written off. Nonetheless, I suspect that their ideas will flounder because a basic and obvious question is being avoided, though as Oliver James remarked, it is one “no researchers have ever posited”. Might human well-being actually have something to do with God?
Can you prove God exists? We began with the ways that believers have attempted to prove the existence of God, or not, examining cosmological and design, ontological and moral reasons for faith. What do they show? What do they fail to achieve? And why do people go on believing for all that no ‘proof’ convinces everyone?
Monday 23rd April
Why science and religion aren’t really at loggerheads. The relationship between theology and the natural sciences is often presented as a zero sum game: if you go with one, you must reject the other. In truth, though, the relationship between the two is much more intimate and it is only in recent years that a great divide has been proposed, one that is arguably narrowing again in our time.
Monday 30th April
Is the Bible true? Fundamentalism is a product of the twentieth century. It rides roughshod over the rich traditions of reading holy scriptures which perceive the truth of the text as in between the word on the page and the life of the believer. Interpretation is not an optional extra. The literal truth used to mean that which is true in life, not in a book. So what went wrong?
Monday 14th May
If God exists, why is there suffering in the world? The problem of evil, as it is called, the question of how an all-powerful, all-good God can allow suffering, is probably the number one reason that people find it hard to believe. And yet, for our forebears, it seems that the opposite was the case. Suffering led people to turn to God. ‘Religion is the wound, not the bandage,’ as Dennis Potter put it.
Monday 21st May
Is nature the new divine? Or to put it another way, is God green? Many increasingly think so. Ecological movements are some of the most energetic and imaginative spiritual movements thriving on the planet. So is traditional religion the enemy of the environment, or does it have resources within it to mobilise the masses of people required to save the planet?
Monday 28th May
Can you be good without God? Most people, these days, know an atheist who lives an inspiring moral life. The link between God and goodness seems to have be severed. Indeed, many would argue that it needs to be severed, for fear that morality might go the way of theology in people’s lives. And yet, is there any truth in the notion that without God, everything is permissible?
Monday 11th June
Can you be spiritual without being religious? Religion is a bad word in many people’s vocabulary. It conjures up memories of school chapel, flawed parish priests, or bloody crusades. Who wants to be tied to one tradition when there is meditation and yoga, shamanism and tantra to chose from, to learn from? Or maybe there are risks in a consumerist approach to spirituality?
Monday 18th June
Is the heart of all religions roughly the same? It’s called the perennial philosophy, the idea that behind all spiritual traditions lie timeless, universal truths. Often cited is the so-called Golden Rule. But what is the perennial philosophy, and how did it come about? And does it really stack up, or risk leaving you pursuing the spiritual dimension in a kind of religious no-man’s land.
In the spring of 399 BC, Socrates drank the hemlock and died. For most of his long life, he had been fortunate enough to live in a democracy. Athens had been an ideal home for a man whose trademark was to ask simple but unsettling questions. If what Plato tells us is right, he would ask politicians whether they really knew what they were talking about when they promised their fellows the good life. It turned out the politicians did not. Worse still, they believed their own rhetoric and were ignorant of their ignorance.
This troubled Socrates. What future for democracy, if it rested on such self-delusion? He felt it was vitally important to admit that the human condition is one of profound uncertainty, deep doubt. We are in between creatures. On the one hand, we are not ignorant and un-self-aware like most other animals. We can learn much. But on the other hand, we are not omniscient and all-seeing like the gods.
This is why the lust for certainty is a sin, as a former Archbishop of York put it, because certainty demands the eradication of doubts and imagining you are a god. Forget that life is enveloped not just by known unknowns but unknown unknowns and you will fall like Icarus from the sky.
Socrates became a philosopher, a lover of wisdom, which is to say someone who sought with a passion to understand what he lacked. He was unlike the politicians in that he knew he was ignorant about many things. It was for this reason that the Delphic oracle had declared that no-one was wiser than he. Wisdom can tolerate doubt.
A few of his fellow citizens took to this message. But it seems that most did not. It is not comfortable to have your ignorance exposed in the marketplace, where Socrates loitered with his unnerving questions. It is not pleasant to feel that being human is like treading water in oceans of untold depths. They said that speaking to Socrates was like being stung by a ray. Others saw him coming and darted down a side street to avoid an encounter.
And in 399 BC it finally came to a head. The first democracy found its greatest son guilty. The freedom to explore the uncertainties at the heart of human life was too much. The citizens lost faith in their new political adventure and in themselves.
I think the word faith is the right one to use, because to be able to doubt requires a kind of faith. It is the faith which tells you that tolerating doubt is worthwhile because amidst the anxieties of ignorance and uncertainty, something useful and valuable will be found. Faith might be defined as the capacity to see that doubt is troubling and meaningful.
To put it another way, a dislike of doubt in politics implies a loss of faith in politics. This does appear accurately to characterize our current condition, given falling membership of political parties and polling evidence on the widespread distrust of politicians.
This is a troubling problem for democracy, because democracy depends upon the goodwill of the people. When faith departs and doubts grow, crisis will follow. Government buildings will have to be surrounded by barricades and police, as has been seen in modern day Athens. Worse, a democratic deficit can become a political crisis from which tyranny may follow. Socrates’ death can be read as symptomatic of such a wobble. In the decade or so before his death, the young democracy had been overturned twice by oligarchs.
Mistakes can be made in responding to this predicament. One is to try to make up for this lack of faith, this not-doing-doubt, by pretending it doesn’t exist, by a kind of force of will. You see it exhibited in the faux-certainty of some political leaders. They affirm absolute confidence in their colleagues, until they are absolutely clear the colleague must go. No-one believes them.
Alternatively, you see the pretence that doubt doesn’t exist when politicians turn to the flaky certainties of evidence-based policy, as if the education of children or the rehabilitation of criminals could be decided by scientific fiat.
The scientists know that their research comes hedged with doubt. But then, there’s the headline. ‘Red wine causes cancer.’ ‘Pre-school children are too stressed.’ The researchers must bury their heads in their hands.
I don’t think there is much mileage in apportioning blame either. Candidates include the media, which has a severe intolerance of doubt, deepened by the 24 hour news cycle.
Or you might point a finger at the welfare state. The argument here is that an advanced welfare state, such as our own, unwittingly nurtures a litigious culture by over-promising on what it can deliver. Someone, somewhere should pay the price for what is, in truth, a humdrum risk of death in life. Or it creates an environment of suspicion in which it is thought that someone, somewhere is in the know about the perils of, say, avian flu. Something must be done.
But again, calls for action easily mutate into demands for certainty, where certainty is not to be had. Doubt-intolerance grows.
A better strategy may be to accept that doubt is a perennial problem for democracies. It was there at the start, with the death of Socrates. He was a victim of democracy’s group psychology, and groups are notoriously unable to bear doubts.
Eighty years after Socrates, Plato’s pupil Aristotle felt the force of that truth. Nationalistic Athens was whipped up again, this time by the democrat and orator Demosthenes, and Aristotle found himself on the wrong side. He left, going into self-exile, because he understood the logic of crowds. He didn’t want the Athenians to commit a crime against philosophy twice.
So much for the dark side. What more positively to do?
It is worth reflecting on the fact that doubt becomes more palatable when sweetened by good humour. Wit allows us to face the unknown with less fear. Sigmund Freud thought that jokes work by converting anxiety into pleasure. He recalled the jest made by the criminal being led to the gallows. It happened to be a Monday morning and so the villain cracked, ‘Not a good start to the week.’ He died more at ease, with a smile.
Socrates too is remembered for his irony. When he was asked what he thought might be a suitable punishment for his crimes, he replied, free meals for life.
To put it another way, Freud continues, humour eases doubt because it releases the energy that feeds the fear. ‘Look here!’, the joke says. ‘This is all that this seemingly dangerous world amounts to. A jest.’ It’s not really true, but for a moment we can feel safer and in that moment maybe learn something lasting about our feelings about doubt.
Satire is certainly part of a mature, democratic society – and it not only pokes fun at those with power. It aids citizens too. It prompts us not to demand faux-certainties from the powerful. It reminds us of their limitations and our own.
To achieve this double effect, it has to be performed in the right spirit - a spirit that prompts we citizens to reflect on ourselves as well has have a laugh at our masters. If satire only mocks the mighty, it may leave us with the comfortable delusion that the mighty are all to blame. If it makes us feel uneasy too, amidst the belly laughs and chuckles, then that might be because it is true to a degree at least, that we get the politicians we deserve.
On occasion, horror and calamity happens. Where there is doubt there is also the real possibility of mishap, error and failure. In the political sphere, Enoch Powell nailed it when he said: ‘All political lives… end in failure because that is the nature of politics and of human affairs.’
But there is hope in his remark too, for it seems to me that there are different ways of failing. One is to fail badly, raging and seeking revenge. The politician who fails in this way will rush to write self-justifying memoirs, instigate scorched earth policies as they leave office, or perhaps place a letter on the desk of their successor noting that there’s no money left.
But there is a good way of failing. I don’t mean a stiff-upper lip kind of failure that grins and bears it. Rather, it’s the good failure that paves a way for what follows.
It’s a subtle attitude, though one well understood in child psychology. The British paediatrician, Donald Winnicott, argued that a mother must fail her child in order that the child can make its way in the world. A perfect mother, who anticipated and fulfilled her child’s every need, would actually be a tyrant. Conversely, the primary-carer of a child must not fail the child too deeply or too often. If that happens, it suffers what Winnicott called impingements – experiences that leave the infant feeling under mortal threat, as if life itself might fail them.
It’s a balance, which Winnicott summed up in the useful phrase, the good-enough mother. The good-enough primary carer fails their charge well, so that the young child discovers a sense of its own agency, its own self.
The psychotherapist, Andrew Samuels, has proposed that this might be a handy notion to deploy in politics. In his book, Politics on the Couch, he argues that we need good-enough politicians. They will fail us because that is what politicians do, that is what life does. However, they might fail us well, so that as citizens their failure can encourage us to discover our agency, to be empowered – like the young child.
We might re-write Enoch Powell. It is not just that all political lives end in failure. Rather, the greatest political lives, knowing they will fail, strive to fail well so that others might live more bravely and better.
There would be benefits if voters could feel that they needed good-enough, not perfect politicians. It might curtail the poisonous cycles of doubt in politics – the apportioning of blame, the demand that something, anything must be done. It might lessen the idealization, when the politician promises the world. And then also the inevitable denigration, when the politician is subsequently belittled for failing to deliver the impossible.
The good-enough principle could be applied to the welfare state too, and the litigious culture that it risks nurturing. A health system that was good-enough would be there for us when serious impingements threatened. And it would also equip us to face up to the uncertainties of life and death. Similarly, an education system that was good-enough would ensure that all children had the basics. And it would also foster the energy, curiosity and pleasure that empowers the child to take the risks that lead to a deeper self-education too.
This might seem fantastical given our punishing political culture today. What politician would survive the mockery of the press were they openly to aim to be good-enough?
And yet, Andrew Samuels continues, perhaps there is a way to do it. What the good-enough politician might cultivate is not delusions of omnipotent power, the certainties that know no doubt. Instead, they could cultivate the energy inherent in the kind of politics that equips others to pioneer change. Such leaders position themselves as catalysts.
It is striking that this kind of politics copes well with doubt. In fact, uncertainty and failure appear to instill only more resolution and faith. Think of environmental politics. Failure presses in on every side, as talks collapse and international meetings fall apart. And yet, every setback renews the energy, inspires more creativity and imagination.
It might be in these arenas that we find lessons in the kind of politics with the faith to face life’s doubts, with the faith to tolerate uncertainty. What they have achieved is a rediscovery of soul. They manifest a kind of political spirituality, in the environmental case shown as a deep respect, a sense of the sacredness, of the earth. This generates a felt sense of aliveness - and so a well-resourced commitment, in spite of it all.
Doubt is before us. Though in truth it always was. We are the in between creature. To live well with doubt is to do well at being human, as Socrates tried to teach those first democrats.
In recent weeks, atheists and agnostics who are friendly towards religion have been filling the column inches. Editors, and perhaps readers, are weary of the so-called militant secularism evangelised by you know who. So kindly non-believers have been commissioned. But there is something paradoxical about their appreciation of "God".
I noticed it a while back when I read Mary Warnock's Dishonest to God. She is an atheist who has spent too much time at cathedral evensong. Her moral and aesthetic imagination would collapse without religious culture: "It seems to me that there is no possible argument for holding that religion is outdated, or that it can be wholly replaced in society by science or any other imaginative exercise." This atheist wants belief in "God" to persist, though it can't by her own logic.
The same conundrum is generously explored in Richard Holloway's autobiographical, Leaving Alexandria: A Memoir of Faith and Doubt. It reads like a confession, the former bishop of Edinburgh writing in searingly honest terms about his limitations, failures and regrets. He was never a saint, or cut out to be one, though he knew some in the Gorbals of Glasgow and possibly at Kelham, his now closed theological college. Holloway passionately laments the cruelty of the institution in which he served for so long. He rehearses the troubling arguments on the problem of evil, the unlikelihood of an afterlife and so on.
And yet, his heart is still tugged by the possibility of the transcendent. When he now walks the Pentland hills, which he has known since his youth, he perhaps detects a divine whisper yet. We must keep religion's poetry, he concludes, because it consoles and humanises. We must purge religion of its prose, the dogmatic formulations that do so much damage.
But, of course, there would not be one without the other. Prose ignites poetry. Poetry inspires prose. So Holloway too seems to be condemned to a parasitic life, drawing on the faith of believers to sustain his doubtful belief. I understand. I've written about life as an agnostic too.
However, if Holloway and Warnock represent the zeitgeist, there is another voice to consider: the erstwhile atheist, now believer.
A few years ago, Roger Scruton penned a melancholic work of autobiography, Gentle Regrets. There he wrote: "By pondering my loss of faith I have steadily regained it, though in a form that stands at a distance from the old religion, endorsing it – but with its own reflected light." In his new book, The Face of God, the spiral into doubt has turned around.
I don't suppose there are many who can follow Scruton in all his convictions, but he achieves a rare thing these days: he writes as if philosophy matters. The Face of God is a densely argued book full of feeling that rewards careful reading.
The critical issue for him stems from a deep reflection on what it is to be human. We know ourselves in two mutually incompatible ways. One is as an object in a world of objects: the human individual is one case among the 7 billion or so that inhabit the planet. The other is as a subject, an "I" who looks out on the world with a distinctive and uniquely valuable perspective.
This fracture in our self-consciousness is felt in all manner of ways. Warnock's love of church music is easily understood by a subject: just go to evensong too. But the richness of that experience is no explanation in objective terms, a deconstruction that music triumphantly resists. More generally, Scruton explains, I have intentions as a subject, which means I can own my life and live responsibly. As an object, though, the human animal is a creature of instincts determined by biological laws.
It seems that we need both aspects to understand ourselves, or to put it in Holloway's terms, we need both the poetry and the prose. But can they be held together?
Scruton argues that this is one purpose of religion, manifest particularly in the concept of the sacred. Why, Holloway might ask, does he find consolation walking the Pentland hills? Are they not merely geological formations blind to existential regrets? It is because, Scruton might reply, the hills speak to you, as you speak to them in your walking, your pilgrimage. They are endowed with meaning when they are meaningful to you. In that moment, you do not treat them as rocks to be used and would be outraged if their beauty were spoiled. That would be sacrilege. And note: only what is held to be sacred can be so profaned.
In other words, the moment you feel the landscape offering you something, rather than being there for the taking, is the moment you sense the world as gift. Therein lies the consolation. Allow that sensibility to take hold and a glimpse of oneness with the cosmos may follow, which may reopen the possibility of God. Scruton writes: "It is an attempt to see our relation to the world as we see our relation to each other – as reaching through the tissue of objects to the thing that they mean … finding subjectivity enfolded, as it were, in the world around us. If there is such a thing as the real presence of God among us, that is how his presence must be understood."
Of course, such intimations are readily dismissed by logic. The language of objectivity is doomed not to comprehend them. But that is only like saying the artist, not the scientist, must be the one to explore the vibrancy of the colour red.
So does it boil down to this? Ours is an age whose conviction rests with the superiority of objective observation over subjective experience. It inculcates the habit of watching yourself living to the detriment of being in life, a problem Holloway movingly admits he has been haunted by. Therein, perhaps, lies the roots of the kindly atheism of our times.
By Mark Vernon on Friday, March 2 2012, 14:56 - Journalism
I've a piece in this week's The Tablet on David Cronenberg's film about Freud, Jung and Spielrein - A Dangerous Method - thinking particularly about the meaning of the relationship between Jung and Spielrein, presumed sexual in a hanky-panky kinda way. A taster:
Such experiences have been called ‘profane spirituality’ by Andrew Samuels, the Professor of Analytical Psychology at the University of Essex. His touchpoint is Jung’s analysis not of sexual pursuits but alcohol abuse. Jung argued that alcoholism is a ‘spiritual quest that had gone off the rails,’ Samuels explains...
‘There is no birth of consciousness without pain,’ Jung wrote in an essay penned when he emerged from his creative illness – though with that darkness, or shadow, comes the promise of life. Jung later proposed that great spiritual innovators tread similar paths too, finding inspiration from their own confrontations with the unconscious. According to tradition, the Buddha was tempted by the daughters of the demon Mara, a story that Jung interpreted as conveying Siddhartha Gautama’s hard won insight into his psyche. Jesus of Nazareth was driven into the wilderness and confronted the forces that approached him there. That which would have destroyed his ministry he faced to resource it.
More generally, it might be said that sins are forgiven not to be forgotten but so that the individual might be freer to understand their deeper meaning for him or her, ‘to recognise the realities of the human psyche’, as Christopher Jamison puts it in Finding Happiness. The strategy of facing inner hatred, envy, lust and anger can be traced back to the early desert fathers. Jung re-describes the process for our psychologically-minded age. The shadow is fearful and disturbing, but makes for spiritual development and openness to the numinous.
He once asked why the injunction to care for those who trouble us in the outer world should not apply to what troubles us in our inner worlds. ‘That I feed the beggar, that I forgive an insult, that I love my enemy in the name of Christ – all these are undoubtedly great virtues,’ he writes. ‘But what if I should discover that the least among them all, the poorest of all beggars, the most impudent of all offenders, yea the very fiend himself – that these are within me.’ We should not condemn this fiend but converse with him and discover his message for us.
By Mark Vernon on Friday, March 2 2012, 14:07 - Journalism
I was on BBC Radio 3's Night Waves last night, talking about the new budget computer, Raspberry Pi. It's being billed not only as inspiring a future generation of computer programmers but also as a way for us all to become 'programmers not programmed'. I doubt that (about 30 minutes into the programme.)
Incidentally, there was also an interview with philosopher David Rothenberg. He was arguing that aesthetics is an additional principle of evolution, alongside fitness and sex, required to understand why whales sing or why bower birds must have blue nests, to the extent that they will kill to secure a blue feather. Hardly adaptive.
This struck me as rather like Simon Conway Morris' argument that mental niches might be explored by evolutionary processes, as much as physical ones.
Rothenberg also told of being round at Thomas Nagel's flat just recently. Nagel, Rothenberg said, knows that he is wrong in his famous essay What Is It Like To Be A Bat ?. That's a bit like saying you know Aristotle knew that he was wrong about final causation.